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Feminist critical theory needs both an account of domination that reflects the reality 
of women’s subordination in societies pervasively structured by gender asymmetry, 
and a theory that provides the possibility for resistance to this domination and re-
sources for social transformation. In her new book, The Politics of Our Selves, Amy 
Allen aims to provide just such an account. She attempts this ambitious project by 
demonstrating that the differences in the critical projects of Foucault and Habermas 
have been sharply overdrawn, and she carves out a middle ground between them. 
She argues that Foucault’s insights on power as an ineliminable part of human social 
life are indispensable for feminist theory. But admitting the pervasiveness of power 
appears to compromise the autonomy necessary to critically reflect upon and resist 
social norms. Allen does not completely agree with this common criticism of Fou-
cault, and emphasizes his discussions of autonomy in his later work. But she argues 
that he fails to provide an adequate account of social life, one that includes mutual 
recognition and reciprocity. For this, she turns to Habermas whose discourse ethics 
is based upon a non-instrumental mutuality.  She looks to Habermas for a more ro-
bust conception of autonomy. However, in order to reconcile Habermas’s ideas with 
Foucault’s insights on power, one has to rethink Habermas’s distinction between va-
lidity and power and recognize the entanglement of power and validity. Ultimately, 
she concludes that feminists should take the best insights from the work of both 
Foucault and Habermas to craft a feminist critical theory capable of explaining both 
the ways in which subjectivity is constituted through relations of power (including 
gender, race and sexual subordination) and of resisting and transforming those 
power relations. 
In chapter one, Allen sets out the parameters of her project. Foucault’s politics 
of the self has two aspects: it is constituted through power relations, and is capable 
of critical reflection and self-transformation (characteristic features of autonomy). 
Yet these two aspects of the politics of the self are usually seen as incompatible; the 
task of Allen’s book is to demonstrate that they are not. The Foucault-Habermas de-
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bate has cast Foucault as anti-Enlightenment and Habermas as continuing the En-
lightenment project of rational critique. This polarization construes Foucault as re-
jecting reason, subjectivity and norms which critics argue leaves him few, if any, re-
sources for social transformation. Critical social theorists such as Habermas, on the 
other hand, overemphasize the power and purity of rationality. This debate contin-
ues in the positions of Judith Butler and Seyla Benhabib, with Benhabib claiming 
that emancipation requires a regulative principle, and Butler invoking Foucault’s 
claim that there is no outside to power.1 Amy Allen takes up the task set out by 
Nancy Fraser of integrating “the Foucaultian account of subjection with the Haber-
masian account of autonomy.”2
After introducing her overall project in chapter one, Allen provides a reading 
of Foucault in chapters two and three that emphasizes his engagement with Kant 
and with the critical project of Modernity. Chapter two reassesses Foucault’s rela-
tionship to Kant. Allen addresses the criticism raised by feminists and critical theor-
ists that in his early work Foucault argues for the death of the subject. A closer look 
at Foucault’s early work reveals that his criticisms of the subject are directed toward 
the dominant philosophical notions of subjectivity, Kant’s transcendental subject 
and the subsequent phenomenological-existential notion of subjectivity. By carefully 
examining Foucault’s engagement with Kant from his early work (his “thèse 
complémentaire”) on Kant’s Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View) through his 
latest work, Allen provides a reading of Foucault as a “continuation through trans-
formation of the Kantian critical project.”
 Allen believes, however, that the two accounts can-
not simply be integrated, but need to be substantially re-worked. Through her meti-
culous and insightful readings, she mines the best insights of Foucault, Butler, Ha-
bermas and Benhabib, and provides a promising new account of subjectivity, one 
that accounts for both power and autonomy.   
3 Having established that Foucault does not 
abandon the subject in his early work, in chapter three Allen turns to Foucault’s later 
work on autonomy and technologies of the self.  Foucault’s analysis of power and 
subjection seems to undermine autonomy, but this is only true if one conceives of 
power and autonomy as diametrically opposed. However, “Foucault conceives of 
autonomy—both in the sense of the capacity for critical reflection and in the sense of 
the capacity for deliberate self-transformation—as always bound up with power.”4
                                                 
1  See Seyla Benhabib, Judith Butler, Drucilla Cornell and Nancy Fraser, Feminist Conten- 
tions: A Philosophical Exchange (New York: Routledge, 1995). 
2   Allen, The Politics of Our Selves, 8. 
3   Ibid., 44. 
4  Allen, The Politics of Our Selves, 47. 
 
Accepting the interrelatedness of autonomy and power means we must transform 
Kant’s notion of autonomy. Foucault inverts the relationship between necessity and 
freedom. Rather than viewing freedom as resulting from the necessity of giving one 
self the moral law as Kant does, Foucault urges us to call “into question that which is 
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presented to us as necessary, thus opening up the space for possible transgression of 
those limits that turn out to be both contingent and linked to objectionable forms of 
constraint.”5
Before turning to Habermas, Allen examines Butler’s work to see how it ex-
tends and supplements Foucault’s account of subjection. Chapter four takes up a 
central question for feminists: How do women resist gender norms, given our ambi-
valent attachment to them? Butler offers an account of subjection that goes some 
way toward explaining why women become attached to normative gender roles in 
spite of the fact that they perpetuate women’s subordination. Because identity is 
constituted through recognition and attachment, painful attachment is better than no 
attachment at all. Allen argues that although Butler’s account of subjection rounds 
out Foucault’s theory by integrating psychoanalytic insights, it does not provide the 
resources to explain how resistance is possible, or how to ensure that a resignifica-
tion transforms social norms, rather than simply reinscribing them. With her charac-
teristically careful reading of texts, Allen points out that Butler conflates dependency 
and subordination, noting that we need an account of dependency that is not subor-
dination for resistance to be possible. As Allen says, “whereas we might have good 
reasons for accepting the view that gender identity under current social and cultural 
conditions requires some individuals to become attached to their own subordina-
tion, there do not seem to be good reasons for accepting the view that becoming a 
subject necessarily involves such an attachment to subordination.” Butler moves to-
wards a fuller and more positive account of social relations in her more recent work, 
Giving An Account of Oneself acknowledging that dependency and vulnerability are 
part of a “fundamental relationality that supports and nurtures us as physical (not to 
mention physic) beings.”
 Allen carefully articulates a Foucaultian notion of the subject that re-
tains autonomy even while constituted through power relations, but in the end she 
concludes that Foucault’s work does not provide the resources necessary for an ac-
count of autonomy capable of resistance and self-transformation. What is needed for 
a stronger conception of autonomy, she claims, is a broader conception of the social, 
specifically a conception of social life that includes non-strategic social relations such 
as reciprocity and mutual recognition. For this she turns to Habermas in chapters 
five and six.  
6
Chapters five, six and seven flesh out the Habermas side of the Foucault-
Habermas debate. Chapter five takes a closer look at the ideas of power and auton-
omy in Habermas, and questions the distinction between power and validity. Allen 
 While Allen agrees with Butler that recognition by others 
constitutes identity, she believes that recognition does not always involve subordi-
nation. Following Jessica Benjamin she believes in the possibility of mutual recogni-
tion (though dynamic and fleeting).     
                                                 
5   Ibid., 65. 
6   Ibid., 87. 
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does a remarkable job of synthesizing and explaining Habermas’s wide-ranging cor-
pus. She delineates three aspects of power in Habermas’s work: the colonization of 
the lifeworld, systematically distorted communication, and individuation through 
socialization. While Habermas himself acknowledges the first two aspects of power, 
Allen develops the third as the most promising for explaining the role that power 
plays in the lifeworld, for instance, in structuring gender subordination. Because 
power is present in the lifeworld, including in familial relationships where identity 
and the capacity for autonomy are formed, Allen argues that Habermas cannot 
maintain the distinction between power and validity in light of his own acknowl-
edgment of the important role that socialization plays in the formation of identity. 
Allen clearly demonstrates that power is a necessary condition for individuation 
through socialization. But does this undermine autonomy and the possibility of cri-
tique entirely? 
As she argues in the following chapter, even though admitting power col-
lapses the empirical/transcendental distinction that Habermas’s wishes to maintain, 
it does not undermine his project entirely. The possibility of critique, and of appeal-
ing to a normative framework still exists. But instead of assuming that validity 
stands apart from power and socio-historical circumstances, we need a more modest 
position. Allen suggests that the pragmatic turn advocated by Thomas McCarthy 
and Maeve Cooke allows for a reconceptualized idea of validity, one that allows for 
the appeal to norms in light of the impurity of reason. A more contextualist and 
pragmatic critical theory would advocate a context transcending validity, rather than 
a context transcendent validity. This approach salvages the concern with norms so 
important to the Habermasian project, while acknowledging the ever-present role of 
power in the social world. Blending the best insights of Foucault and Habermas, Al-
len says we need to develop a “principled form of contextualism that emphasizes 
our need both to posit context-transcending ideals and to continually unmask their 
status as illusions rooted in interest and power-laden contexts.”7
In chapter seven Allen takes up feminist critical theorist Seyla Benhabib’s 
work. Benhabib’s interactive universalism gives more credence to particularity than 
Habermas’s communicative ethics, and this goes some way toward establishing a 
critical social theory that retains a strong notion of autonomy, and the ability to ap-
peal to norms while adding sensitivity to cultural and historical particularity. How-
ever, in spite of Benhabib’s own concerns about Habermas’s excessive rationalism, 
Allen discovers a “rationalist residue” in Benhabib’s account of the self. Namely, de-
spite Benhabib’s attention to gender in her work, she holds the “implausible view 
that there is an ungendered core to the self, and that gender is like clothes we can 
outgrow or shoes we can leave behind.”
  
8
                                                 
7   Ibid., 148. 
8   Ibid., 159. 
 For Benhabib, gender is just one of the 
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narratives that we weave into our narrative conception of the self. But Allen cites 
empirical evidence that gender identity precedes our ability to construct a narrative 
account of the self. And, of course, the formation of gender identity takes place with-
in power relations. Allen’s main criticism of Benhabib mirrors her earlier criticism of 
Habermas that power goes “all the way down,” structuring not only our options, but 
also the very selves who choose.  
In her conclusion she discusses the implications for feminism: How can 
women resist normative femininity given that our very selves are structured by it? 
Allen suggests two sources for such self-transformation, the conceptual and norma-
tive resources offered by social movements, such as the women’s movement or 
queer movement. And new possibilities found in the social and cultural imaginary 
via literature, film and art. One might wish that she had developed these sugges-
tions further: How do the alternatives to gender and sexuality norms already pro-
duced by these historic social movements play a role in individual self-
transformation? Although Foucault shied away from prescriptive accounts of social 
and political change, in his later essays and interviews he discussed how the alterna-
tive social arrangements among gay men could inspire new possibilities for social 
relationships for everyone.    
Allen’s nuanced and careful readings of Foucault, Butler, Habermas and 
Benhabib demonstrate that both subjection and autonomy are necessary for an ade-
quate theory of the self, and that the tension between Foucault’s position and Ha-
bermas’s has been exaggerated. She offers us a Kantian reading of Foucault, and a 
contextualized, historicized version of Habermas that brings their projects together 
in interesting and productive ways, illuminating both sides of the politics of our-
selves, autonomy and subjection.  
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